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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “fairness” doctrine in corporate law is rhetorically glorious.  
Courts speak of scrutinizing transactions tainted by self-dealing for 
“entire fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and even “inherent fairness.”  In 
theory, the doctrine should be a boon to shareholder-plaintiffs, especially 
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as contrasted with corporate law’s usual tendency to defer to the 
business judgment of corporate insiders.  But in cases where courts 
discuss the fairness doctrine, how often have plaintiffs actually won?  
Are there meaningful differences in the three articulations of the 
doctrine, or are the adjectives fancy verbiage?  Are some fairness cases 
more important than others in promulgating the doctrine?  While 
anecdotes abound, precious little empirical research exists to address 
these questions. 
This Article uses a new tool—network analysis—to perform an 
empirical study of fairness doctrine as developed by the Delaware 
Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery.1  It creates 
network maps to visually represent the topology of Delaware’s fairness 
jurisprudence, using actual cases as nodes on graphs and 
interrelationships among cases as arcs connecting the nodes.  These 
maps, along with metrics that describe the characteristics of the network, 
provide rich data through which to understand fairness jurisp
ore systematically. 
Given that fairness is the standard of judicial review most favorable to 
plaintiffs, the status of fairness doctrine has broad implications for 
corporate law.  In particular, if fairness ends up being little more than 
rhetorical flourish, then a stark choice lies around the corner: either 
abandon the notion that corporate law can help shareho
structure standards of review to benefit shareholders. 
The hope is that readers uninterested in corporate law will find this 
Article’s methodology informative.  Network theory has enjoyed recent 
successes in conceptualizing the topology of systems in the physical and 
social sciences.  But it has been vastly underutilized in the law
alysis of fairness is offered merely as a small legal application. 
This Article is structured into three principal sections.  Part II offers 
background on the subject and method of inquiry.  It discusses the role 
of fairness in the panoply of standards of review, and follows with an 
introduction to the network theory.  Part III describes the empirical 
methods used—from data gathering to analysis to the display of results, 
resulting in three network maps of fairness jurisprudence in Delaware 
case law.  Finally, Part IV discusses the questions with which this 
introduction begins to dete
 1. The Delaware Court of Chancery is the court of first instance for corporate 
matters.  See Welcome to the Delaware Court of Chancery, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ 
Court%20of%20Chancery/. Delaware, of course, is the leading jurisdiction in matters of 
corporate law.  Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 474 
(2005). 
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II.  THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
A.  Fairness as a Standard of Review 
The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), like other state 
corporation codes, consists principally of a series of default provisions 
around which management and shareholders can, at least in theory, 
contract.2  In the vocabulary of corporate law, the DGCL is thus 
principally an “enabling statute” that eschews mandatory regulation,3  
which contrasts with common law fiduciary duties developed as a means 
of regulating the behavior of corporate leaders.  As three prominent 
current and former Delaware judges note, “what emerged as a counterpoint 
to the evolution of the enabling model of corporation law [statutes] was 
the second key function of the law of corporations: the ex post judicial 
review of the actions of corporate officers and directors, measured by 
fiduciary principles.”4  Judges use various standards of review5 to apply 
fiduciary principles: put simply, the stricter the standard of review, the 
more likely a court will question the behavior of defendant-insiders and 
find for plaintiff-shareholders.6 
 2. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power 
and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–
84 (2002) (“The dominant contemporary view of corporate law is contractarian, meaning 
that corporate constituencies are assumed to be best able to determine their mutual rights 
and obligations by way of voluntary arrangement.”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2496 (2005) (noting that corporation statutes reflect the belief 
“that corporate law is, or should be, the contract that investors and managers want”). 
 3. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant 
for Corporate Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 216 (2005) (“State 
corporate law is in essence enabling, following a menu approach that permits firms to 
alter statutory defaults to fit their needs.”). 
 4. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
859, 861 (2001); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What 
Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A 
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (“The 
‘flesh and blood’ of corporate law is judge-made.  It is the common law formulation of 
principles of fiduciary duties articulated on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 4, at 867 (“A judicial standard of review is a 
value-laden analytical instrument that . . . describes the task a court performs in 
determining whether action by corporate directors violated their fiduciary duty.”). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 869 (“[S]tandards of review reflect significant value judgments 
about the social utility of permitting greater or lesser insulation of director conduct from 
judicial scrutiny.”). 







act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach 
 
The baseline standard of review, the business judgment rule (BJR), is 
very defendant-friendly.  The BJR presumes that “in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, . . . 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of 
the company.”7  As Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court observes, the BJR “is the foundation of [Delaware’s] 
corporation law.  That rule teaches that courts will not second-guess 
directors’ business decisions and will not interfere with investors’ 
expectation that directors will take honest and prudent business risks to 
advance the economic well-being of the enterprise.”8  Put in the language of 
torts, the BJR shifts the duty of care from negligence to something akin 
to a gross negligence standard: violations are found only where there is 
“reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests of the 
whole body of stockholders”9 or actions which are “without the bounds 
of reason.”10  Predictably, as long as the BJR applies, the defendants are 
virtually guaranteed to win.11  As such, it is not an interesting standard 
of review upon which to conduct an empirical analysis of case
tcomes.12 
There are, however, other standards of review where courts are s
s deferential to insiders.  As Chief Justice Veasey observes, 
[D]irectors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are 
interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, 
 7. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (“The [BJR] operates to preclude a 
court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”); 
E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. 
LAW. 393, 394 (1997). 
 8. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1442. 
 9. Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929). 
 10. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974).  As Mark Roe has 
noted, the BJR “has courts refusing to directly help shareholders who attack managerial 
mistake.”  Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 235 (2002). 
 11. There is one prominent case where the Delaware Supreme Court found 
directors to have behaved in a grossly negligent manner.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).  Amusingly enough, the Delaware legislature subsequently 
permitted corporations to contract out of even gross negligence, at least as to monetary 
liability.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007); see also Roe, supra note 10, at 
243 (“One does not exaggerate much by saying that American corporate law has 
produced only one major instance in which nonconflicted managers were held liable to 
pay for their mismanagement: Smith v. Van Gorkom, a decision excoriated by managers 
and their lawyers, and one promptly overturned.”). 
 12. Indeed, the BJR “is not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all.  
Rather, it is an expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors’ decision 
when a judge has already performed the crucial task of determining that certain 
conditions exist.”  Allen et al., supra note 4, at 870. 
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their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider 
all material facts reasonably available.13 
A variety of these standards purport to apply heightened scrutiny.14  This 
Article focuses on the most stringent, fairness analysis, which is most 
commonly called the “entire fairness”15 standard.  The fairness standard 
applies 
if the challenged transaction arises in a context of self-dealing; that is, if the 
corporate fiduciaries have stood on both sides of the transaction and approved 
its terms.  In that setting, because the fiduciaries charged with protecting the 
interest of the public shareholders have a conflicting self interest, those 
fiduciaries must establish the transaction’s “entire fairness” to the satisfaction of 
the reviewing court.16 
In a self-dealing situation, “the burden of proof shifts to the proponents of 
the transaction, who must demonstrate its ‘entire fairness.’”17 
 13. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1422 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000)); see also Veasey, supra note 7, at 394 (“A business 
decision will normally be sustained unless the presumption is rebutted in either of two 
ways: (i) the process, independence, or good faith of the directors is compromised; or (ii) 
the decision cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose.”). 
 14. See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115–17 (Del. 
1994). 
 16. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988); 
see also Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory 
Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396 (2003) (noting fairness standard applies to 
“[c]orporate self-dealing [which] arises in transactions involving a conflict of interest 
between a member of the corporation and the corporation”).  Needless to say, self-
dealing “may be found in many corporate actions and deals such as those between a 
corporation and the party controlling it, a subsidiary, a director or officer of the 
corporation, or any other entity in which a shareholder may have an interest.”  Id.; cf. 
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shareholders Entitled to the 
Residual?, 32 J. CORP. L. 103, 114 (2006) (“[C]ourts police only insider deals, in which a 
dominant shareholder or other insider receives corporate assets on terms not available to 
others.”).  Predictably, the exact boundaries of where fairness standards apply remain 
murky.  See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500 n.13 (Del. Ch. 
1990) (“The precise circumstances that will trigger the ‘entire fairness’ standard of 
review have not been consistently articulated in the Delaware cases.”). 
 17. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking—Some 
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 61 (1985); see also Goshen, supra note 
16, at 396–97 (“In Delaware, the most important state of incorporation in the United 
States, self-dealing transactions are subject to the ‘entire fairness’ test: [t]he interested 
party must demonstrate that the transaction is the product of ‘fair dealing’ and reflects a 
‘fair price.’”).  Needless to say, fairness analysis appears in duty of loyalty cases.  See, 
e.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1426 (“Entire fairness, which incorporates 
elements of fair dealing and fair price, is traditionally tied to situations involving self-
dealing—in other words, loyalty cases.”).  The duty of loyalty is the antithesis of self-




Intuitively, one would expect decisions that recognize fairness analysis 
to be friendly to plaintiffs.18  In a fascinating and counterintuitive 
development, however, some distinguished commentators have suggested 
that heightened standards of review such as fairness analysis may in fact 
be little more than clever rhetoric.  For instance, in the 1970s, Victor 
Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein suggested that in the context of parent-
subsidiary mergers, the difference between the BJR and the intrinsic 
fairness standards “is not significant.”19  More recently, William Bratton 
and Joseph McCahery have put forth the notion that the Delaware 
“courts garnered publicity in a handful of highly publicized cases, ruling 
against management and announcing vague standards that held out the 
prospect of shareholder value enhancement.  But in less well-publicized 
subsequent cases, they used the camouflage of complex facts to refrain 
from applying the standards in management-constraining ways.”20  This 
Article’s first objective is to assess whether such concerns are valid by 
performing an empirical analysis. 
A second fascinating question emerges from the fact that fairness—
while most often called entire fairness—has also been variously 
described as inherent fairness,21 or intrinsic fairness.22  But as students 
learning corporations sometimes rightfully ask, are there meaningful 
differences between these three articulations?  Critical commentary is 
virtually unanimous in suggesting that these terms mean the same 
dealing and “mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes 
precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder 
and not shared by the stockholders generally.”  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
 18. As one observer summarizes the divergence: 
    The business judgment rule and the “entire fairness” standard represent a 
dichotomy of judicial review that correlates with the absence or presence of 
director self-interest in a given corporate transaction.  When a director acts out 
of self-interest, or engages in self-dealing, that director has breached his duty 
of loyalty, and the director must affirmatively defend the inherent fairness of 
the challenged transaction.  On the other hand, under the business judgment 
rule, Delaware courts will defer to the actions of a director who has not acted 
out of self-interest; his actions are presumed to be valid. 
Donald G. Brabson, Comment, Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc.: “Enhanced 
Scrutiny”—Delaware’s Judicial Standard of Review for a Single Bid Corporate 
Acquisition?, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 141 (1993). 
 19. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers 
and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 318 n.49 (1974).  The authors do wonder, however, 
whether it might be “possible that judicial articulation of the difference inhibits those 
who negotiate parent-subsidiary mergers more than those who corrupt ‘independent’ 
management with side payments.”  Id. 
 20. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of 
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 681–82 (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 721 (Del. 1983). 
 22. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971). 
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thing.23  But does analysis of the cases bear this perspective out?  If so, 
then why have courts created three different terms? 
Already, then, two major questions emerge: 
(1) Do cases that discuss impressive-sounding fairness standards 
actually employ these standards to help plaintiffs? 
(2) Is the jurisprudence precise enough to inform different 
standards of fairness? 
Needless to say, these questions lend themselves to an empirical analysis 
of Delaware cases that discuss fairness.  Before embarking on this analysis, 
however, it is important to outline the principles of network theory, the 
tool that will frame the analysis. 
B.  Network Theory 
To address the two questions outlined, the analysis must necessarily 
understand the interrelationships among cases.  Put in more technical 
terms, the topology—or configuration—of Delaware cases discussing 
fairness must be mapped.  This mapping might show, for instance, whether 
cases referring to intrinsic fairness have tended to favor corporate 
insiders, or whether cases that reference inherent fairness actually cite 
 23. See Bradley R. Aronstam et al., Delaware’s Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering 
Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 
58 BUS. LAW. 519, 523 n.31 (2003) (“Delaware courts frequently use the terms ‘intrinsic 
fairness’ and ‘entire fairness’ interchangeably.”); Daniel S. Cahill & Stephen P. Wink, 
Time and Time Again the Board Is Paramount: The Evolution of the Unocal Standard 
and the Revlon Trigger Through Paramount v. Time, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 162 
n.16 (1990) (“The cases refer to the fairness prong as the ‘entire fairness’ test, or the 
‘intrinsic fairness test.’  The terms are interchangeable.” (citations omitted)); Harvey J. 
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, 
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 647 (1998) (“State cases use tests 
like ‘entire fairness,’ ‘intrinsic fairness,’ and ‘inherent fairness’ in these situations.  In 
general, what these terms mean is that directors and officers will have to carry a heavy 
burden of showing that the acquisition process and price were fair to the 
corporation . . . .”); Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe 
Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245, 2255 n.49 (2004) (“‘Entire fairness’ and ‘intrinsic 
fairness’ are terms used interchangeably by Delaware courts.”); Janet E. Kerr, Delaware 
Goes Shopping for a “New” Interpretation of the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the 
QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 615 n.32 (1995); Jeffrey J. 
Schick, Note, Toward Transaction-Specific Standards of Directorial Fiduciary Duty in 
the Tracking-Stock Context, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1365, 1385 n.157 (2000); Mary Siegel, 
The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 49 n.101 
(1999). 




back to cases that use and distinguish the term from other fairness standards. 
Unfortunately, traditional legal tools are perhaps not enough.  Law is 
conventionally conceptualized as a simple, static grid.  As Pierre Schlag 
observes in his study of the aesthetics of law, “In the grid aesthetic, law 
is pictured as a two-dimensional area divided into contiguous, well-
bounded legal spaces.  These spaces are divided into doctrines, rules, and 
the like.  Those doctrines, rules, and the like are further divided into elements, 
and so on and so forth.”24  Schlag’s description should be particularly 
familiar to legal educators and law students—after all, the “law 
school curriculum remains largely grid-like.  Then there are the grids of 
student study aids—the outlines and decision trees laid out in Gilbert’s, 
Emanuel’s, Barron’s, and the like.”25  Trying to squeeze the evolution of 
fairness cases into such a simple topology, however, is at best incomplete. 
Fortunately, the emerging discipline of network theory can provide 
legal analysts with a tool that complements the grid.  Network theory 
presents an exciting way to conceptualize and visualize new topologies.  
While its applications might get quite convoluted, it is important to 
begin by remembering that its underlying principle is actually very 
simple: “At its core, network analysis maps and measures relationships 
between, for example, people, groups, computers, or information.”26  
The theory has already spurred significant discussion in the scientific 
community.  As the applied mathematician Steven Strogatz recounts 
with a touch of humor: 
    In our lighter moments we play parlour games about connectivity.  “Six 
degrees of Marlon Brando” broke out as a nationwide fad in Germany, as 
readers of Die Zeit tried to connect a falafel vendor in Berlin with his favourite 
actor through the shortest possible chain of acquaintances.  And during the 
height of the Lewinsky scandal, the New York Times printed a diagram of the 
famous people within “six degrees of Monica.” 
    . . . Empirical studies have shed light on the topology of food webs, electrical 
power grids, cellular and metabolic networks, the World-Wide Web, the 
Internet backbone, the neural network of the nematode worm Caenorhabditis 
elegans, telephone call graphs, coauthorship and citation networks of scientists, 
and the quintessential “old-boy” network, the overlapping boards of directors of 
the largest companies in the United States.27 
 24. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051 
(2002). 
 25. Id. at 1068.  Schlag provides a theoretical description of three additional 
aesthetics.  In “the energy aesthetic, law is cast in the image of energy.  Conflicting 
forces of principle, policy, values, and politics collide and combine in sundry ways.”  Id. 
at 1051.  By contrast, in “the perspectivist aesthetic, the identities of law and laws mutate 
in relation to point of view.”  Id. at 1052.  Finally, in “the dissociative aesthetic, identities 
collapse into each other.  Nothing is what it is, but is always already something else.”  Id. 
 26. James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal 
Importance of Supreme Court Precedents, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 325 (2007). 
 27. Steven H. Strogatz, Exploring Complex Networks, 410 NATURE 268, 268 
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Networks like those Strogatz describes are mapped in terms of “nodes” 
and “arcs.”  For example, legal actors or cases might occupy nodes and 
be connected to each other via arcs.  The ensuing graph illustrates the 
topology of the network.28 
At a very basic level, network graphs emphasize that entities do not 
exist in isolation, but are connected to other entities.29  Over time their 
shape and composition can evolve to reflect changes among nodes, permitting 
dynamic analysis.  Networks thus can provide a visual representation of 
a system such as the law in a way that is much richer than, say, a grid.30 
While so far vastly underutilized in the law, there do exist a few 
instances where legal scholars have applied network analysis.  David 
Post and Michael Eisen wrote a pioneering article in 2000 that sought to 
represent cases not as simple entries in a grid, but as an evolving and 
interrelated network.  They performed a citation analysis of cases 
(2001); see also M. Girvan & M.E.J. Newman, Community Structure in Social and 
Biological Networks, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7821, 7821 (2002). 
 28. See, e.g., Figures 1–3, infra pp. 19–20. 
 29. As the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard argues: 
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric 
of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before.  Young or 
old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at “nodal points” 
of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be. 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 15 
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979); cf. 
PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 112 (1992) 
(“The post-modern world is said to be ‘intertextual,’ and this means, for the skeptical 
post-modernists, that everything one studies is related to everything else. . . .  [T]he 
world is so complicated, chaotic, and intertwined that it would be impossible to untangle 
the threads that connect all these interactions. . . .”); Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of 
Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L. REV. 249, 291 (1993) (“[I]ndividuals are 
constituted socially and legal relations are bound up inextricably with social relations.”).  
For a discussion of the relationship between postmodernism and network theory, see 
generally Reza Dibadj, Postmodernism, Representation, Law, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 377 
(2007). 
 30. More subtly, network theory can provide localized spatial narratives at an 
intermediate level of analysis that permits analysis of groups and organizations.  
Traditional legal analysis tends to occur at two extremes: either isolated actors (for 
example, the tortfeasor or the shareholder), or society at large (for example, the state or 
the nation).  By contrast, the law has not been very sophisticated in analyzing 
intermediate level entities such as firms.  See generally Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the 
Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005) (discussing the concept of the firm in various 
economic and psychological frameworks); see also Janine R. Wedel et al., Toward an 
Anthropology of Public Policy, 600 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 30, 41 (2005) 
(“The value of a theoretical and methodological framework that can both dissect and 
connect levels (such as local and global) and spheres (such as state and private) is 
difficult to overstate in a multilayered and rapidly changing world.”). 




decided in 1930, 1950, 1970, and 1980 by the New York Court of 
Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  
The analysis found that a very small number of cases received a 
disproportionately large percentage of citations, whereas the vast 
majority of cases were cited very infrequently.31 
In other words, there are a few very well-connected nodes that 
determine the topology of the network and very many smaller ones 
scattered about.  Their findings match those of scientists studying physical 
phenomena, namely, that “some nodes are more highly connected than 
others are. . . .  [T]here are a few nodes with many links.”32  These networks 
are typically modeled using what mathematicians call “power-law” 
distributions where a small number of nodes have many arcs connecting 
them to other nodes, but the vast majority of nodes have exponentially 
fewer connections.33 
More recent research is confirming Post and Eisen’s insight.  Thomas 
Smith has begun mapping the “web of law”—the citation frequency of a 
broad range of state and federal cases to find similarly skewed 
patterns.34  The United States Supreme Court, given its importance, has 
been the subject of the most detailed analyses to date.  Scholars 
analyzing its citation patterns have found results consistent with Smith’s 
broader inquiry.35  A common, although perhaps surprising, theme is 
emerging among this new research.  Namely, “the vast majority of 
decisions are cited by only a few cases, but there are a few decisions that 
are widely cited.  Similarly, most decisions contain only a few citations, 
but there are a few decisions that cite a large number of cases.”36  In 
 31. See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the Coastline of the Law? 
Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 570–79 
(2000). 
 32. Strogatz, supra note 27, at 274. 
 33. Network theorists often label these networks as “‘scale-free,’ by analogy with 
fractals, phase transitions and other situations where power laws arise and no single 
characteristic scale can be defined.”  Id.; see also Post & Eisen, supra note 31, at 559 
(“The idea that legal doctrine and argumentation, like so much of the physical and 
biological world, is generated by a recursive process and has a kind of fractal structure is 
certainly a powerful and intriguing metaphor.”). 
 34. See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 310–16 
(2007). 
 35. See, e.g., Seth J. Chandler, The Network Structure of Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence (Univ. of Houston Pub. Law and Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 2005-W-
01, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=742065; Frank B. 
Cross et al., The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law 10 (June 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=909217 (“The distribution of citation references is highly 
skewed.  Only two percent of the total number of decided [United States Supreme Court] 
cases receives fifty-six percent of all citations in the network.  Roughly 28,000 cases [out 
of 47,869] have been cited only once.”); Fowler et al., supra note 26, at 325, 344. 
 36. James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent: 
A Network Analysis, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16, 18 (2008). 
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other words, the degree distributions exhibit what is called a power-law 
tail.  In turn, this power-law tail “suggests that there is something 
systematic about the evolution of law that mimics the evolution of 
other network p 37
A third question thus emerges: 
(3) Does Delaware case law around fairness exhibit a skewed 
distribution resembling a power law? 
This question is important and worth addressing, especially since its 
answer will emerge largely from network analysis necessary to address 
the first two questions.  But the third question  is also the easiest of the 
three.  After all, it can be addressed through brute force: by mechanically 
scanning case citation patterns without regard to whether the cited case 
actually stands for the proposition it is cited for, or even whether the 
citation is positive or negative.  In other words, it simply tests the power-law 
hypothesis against a new set of cases.  The first and second questions, on 
the other hand, present a significant extension in methodology from 
previous studies since they necessarily delve into the context in which a 
case is cited.38  All three questions are worth analyzing, but the first two 
are arguably more novel and challenging. 
III.  EMPIRICAL METHODS 
To address these three questions, this Article performs an empirical 
analysis of Delaware cases that discuss the three standards of fairness.  
As with empirical work generally, three steps frame the effort: gathering 
the data, analyzing it, and displaying the results. 
 37. Fowler et al., supra note 26, at 344.  Network analysis is inherently 
interdisciplinary and requires insights from a variety of disciplines, including computer 
science, applied mathematics, sociology, statistical physics, and anthropology.  A 
wonderful opportunity thus emerges for legal academics to collaborate with scholars 
from a variety of other disciplines from both the physical and social sciences.  Cf. 
BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 50 (Catherine Porter trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1993) (1991) (“In what world are these multitudes to be housed?  Are we in 
the realm of biology, sociology, natural history, ethics, sociobiology?”). 
 38. Cf. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 36, at 29 (noting how, in future work, they 
would “like to examine the role of context in the citation network. . . .  We believe that a 
contextual exploration of the positive and negative nature of each citation . . . may yield 
additional insights into the network of precedent and its effect on the relative importance 
of cited decisions.”). 
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First, a universe of cases was defined and its features collected.  
Occurrences of the terms “entire fairness,” “inherent fairness,” and 
“intrinsic fairness” were searched in all opinions of the Delaware 
Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery that are available 
electronically on LexisNexis.39  Cases were excluded where the terms 
were used in contexts that did not have to do with judicial review of 
fiduciary duties of corporate insiders.40 
For each case within each fairness standard, two subsets of data are 
collected.  The first set helps to describe the case itself: its name, the 
date it was decided, the court that decided it, whether the portion of the 
opinion having to do with fairness analysis ended up helping the plaintiff 
or the defendant,41 and the phase of litigation during which the opinion 
arose.42  Table 1 provides a high-level overview of the universe of cases 
analyzed. 
TABLE 1                                                                                                                    








Cases       
 Del. Supreme Court 11 39% 25 32% 68 20% 
 Del. Court of Chancery 17 61% 51 65% 261 78% 
 Total Delaware Courts 28 100% 76 96% 329 98% 
 Non-Delaware Courts 0 0% 3 4% 6 2% 
 Total cases (nodes) 28 100% 79 100% 335 100% 
Years 1952–2006 1922–2002 1921–2006 
 
 
 39. More specifically, I use the “DECTS” file within the “STATES” library.  This 
file includes Delaware Supreme Court opinions from 1832 and Court of Chancery 
opinions beginning in 1814.  Interestingly, however, the earliest cases mentioning 
fairness date from the early twentieth century.  See Table 1. 
 40. Notably, where the terms were used in the context of class certifications, 
settlements, or unincorporated associations. 
 41. The cases that are defendant-friendly are subdivided into two categories: those 
in which the court noted that the fairness standard is inapplicable, and those in which the 
standard was held applicable but met by the defendants. 
 42. For example, whether the case concerns a preliminary injunction, a motion to 
dismiss, summary judgment, or a decision after trial. 
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This table accords with intuition along both its horizontal and vertical 
dimensions: most cases analyzing fairness are entire fairness cases,43 
and the Chancery Court adjudicates the bulk of corporate law cases
The second subset of data describes the interrelationships among cases 
by creating an N x N matrix45 that lists the cases both vertically and 
horizontally.  Every time a case in a row cites another case as part of its 
fairness analysis, an indication is made in the column corresponding to 
the cited case.46 
Once the data has been gathered, the second step is to analyze it.  
Spreadsheets and other conventional software programs are unfortunately 
not designed for network analysis.  As a consequence, the data in the 
spreadsheet was reformatted and fed into Pajek, specialized software 
designed to analyze networks.47  Note, of course, that the first data 
subset defined above supplies the characteristics of the nodes (vertices) 
in the network.  The second subset defines the arcs (lines) emanating 
from citing case to cited case.  Together, this data specifies the topology 
of the network.  The specialized software processes these data points and 
generates graphs, as well as some mathematical metrics that capture the 
principal features of the network. 
Thirdly and finally, the network analysis needs to be displayed in a 
user-friendly manner.  To try to achieve aesthetically pleasing images, 
the output of the network analysis was fed into specialized graphical 
software48 able to generate graphs in scalable vector graphics (SVG).49 
 43. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 44. As Chief Justice Veasey reminds us, “Delaware corporate jurisprudence is 
authoritatively framed, in part, by a discrete number of decisions of the Delaware 
Supreme Court.  It is also framed, in part, by a plethora of Delaware Court of Chancery 
decisions . . . .”  Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 4, at 1401.  A case that discusses 
more than one standard appears separately in the analysis for each standard.  For 
example, a case that discusses all three fairness standards will appear in each of the 
“entire fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and “inherent fairness” analyses. 
 45. N, of course, represents the total number of cases within each of the three 
standards.  Namely, 28 for “inherent fairness,” 79 for “intrinsic fairness,” and 335 for 
“entire fairness.”   
 46. More than half of the cells in the matrix will necessarily remain empty: the 
diagonal is empty because a case cannot refer to itself; moreover, a case cannot refer to a 
case that occurs later in time. 
 47. Pajek, developed at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, has recently 
emerged as a leading network analysis package in large part due to its ability to analyze 
very large networks.  See Networks/Pajek: Program for Large Network Analysis, 
http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
 48. Unfortunately, the graphical output from the network analysis software is 
difficult to read.  For example, diagrams are off-center and have awkward aspect ratios. 




The results of these efforts are represented visually using three network 
diagrams, one for each of the three standards.50  A circular node, proportional 
in size to the frequency with which it is cited, represents each case.  Nodes 
are color coded: blue nodes represent cases where fairness analysis was 
employed in a plaintiff-friendly manner; red or yellow nodes, where it 
was used to support a defendant-friendly conclusion.  Yellow denotes 
situations where a fairness standard was discussed but not applied; red, 
where the court applied a fairness standard, but determined that the 
defendants had met it. 
Interrelationships among the cases are shown using arcs.  Black lines 
depict citations that are linguistically consistent; for example, a line 
might denote that a case cited for its entire fairness analysis actually did 
discuss entire fairness.  On the other hand, light grey lines depict citations 
that are linguistically inconsistent; for example, where a case cited for its 
discussion of entire fairness actually discussed another standard.51  
Finally, there are a very small number of citations to non-Delaware 
cases—these are represented using dashed lines. 
The graphs (Figures 1–3) depict a two-dimensional network layout as 
generated using the Kamada-Kawai spring embedder algorithm, familiar 
to network analysts.52  Happily, insights into the three questions that 
drive this Article emerge from these graphs and the metrics generated by 
the network analysis software. 
IV.  FINDINGS 
At this point, it is perhaps worth repeating the three questions that 
drive this article: 
(1) Do cases that discuss impressive-sounding fairness standards 
actually employ these standards to help plaintiffs? 
(2) Is the jurisprudence precise enough to inform different 
standards of fairness? 
 49. Traditional bitmap images that are readable by most Windows-based programs 
cannot be accurately scaled to different display sizes.  As a consequence, SVG images 
were generated and outputted to the familiar portable document format (PDF). 
 50. Figure 1 displays “inherent fairness,” Figure 2 “intrinsic fairness,” and Figure 3 
“entire fairness.”  See infra pp. 19–20. 
 51. Such as “intrinsic fairness” or “inherent fairness” or “fairness” generically. 
 52. In network drawing, 
[t]he most important principle states that the distance between vertices should 
express the strength or number of their ties as closely as possible. . . .  
[V]ertices that are connected should be drawn closer together than vertices that 
are not related.  A good drawing minimizes the variation in the length of lines. 
WOUTER DE NOOY ET AL., EXPLORATORY SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH PAJEK 14 
(2005).  For a discussion of Kamada-Kawai, see id. at 16–17. 
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(3) Does Delaware case law around fairness exhibit a skewed 
distribution resembling a power law? 
This section addresses each question. 
A.  Do Fairness Standards Actually Help Plaintiffs? 
I address this question using both basic statistics and visual inspection 
of the network topologies.  Each source provides a set of insights. 
First, and most simply, the number of cases in which courts used 
fairness standards in a plaintiff-friendly manner can be compared to 
those in which courts discussed fairness standards but the standard ended 
up not helping the plaintiff.  This latter category is further divided into 
two subcategories: cases in which the standard was discussed but not 
applied, and cases in which the standard was applied and deemed met by 
the defendants.  Table 2a provides a summary of this analysis. 
TABLE 2A                                                                                                                         
CASE OUTCOMES 
 




Entire        
Fairness 
Outcome       
Plaintiff-friendly 16 57% 30 38% 127 38% 
Defendant-friendly       
     Standard not applied 6 21% 32 41% 139 41% 
     Standard applied and met 4 14% 15 19% 39 12% 
Total defendant-friendly 10 36% 47 59% 178 53% 
Neither 2 7% 2 3% 30 9% 
 
Interestingly, except for the relatively few cases comprising inherent 
fairness analysis, in a majority of cases discussing intrinsic fairness and 
entire fairness these fairness standards ended up not helping plaintiffs. 
Table 2a also shows that defendant-friendly cases split into two 
subcategories.  The first, and most common, is for the court simply to 
note that the standard is inapplicable.  The most popular technique is for 
a director or officer to obtain approval from a putatively “independent” 
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pendent” body.  
 
body53—shareholders or the board, or even a special committee composed 
of “disinterested” board members.54  This procedure conveniently 
lowers the standard of review to the BJR.55  Other, most esoteric, 
possibilities include structuring a minority freezeout as a tender offer 
rather than a merger56 or using the short-form merger statute to elude 
fairness review.57  The second, less prevalent, method is for a court to 
acknowledge the applicability of the standard, but argue that it has 
been met.  Most commonly, this pattern occurs when a controlling 
shareholder shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff by obtaining 
approval from an “inde 58
 53. See, e.g., Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. 
CORP. L. 333, 334 (2002); Charles M. Yablon, On the Allocation of Burdens of Proof in 
Corporate Law: An Essay on Fairness and Fuzzy Sets, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 501 
(1991) (“Interested-director transactions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty unless they 
are ‘intrinsically fair’ to the corporation.  Transactions subject to the business judgment 
rule, in contrast, or those ratified by the appropriate disinterested groups, only breach 
management’s fiduciary duty if they involve ‘waste’ or a ‘gift’ of corporate assets.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 54. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983); In re 
W. Nat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 15927, 2000 WL 710192, at *25–26 (Del. Ch. May 
22, 2000). 
 55. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 
24, 2000).  This procedure has even been codified in Delaware’s safe harbor statute.  The 
statute states in relevant part: 
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its 
directors or officers, . . . shall be void or voidable solely for this reason . . . 
if: 
(1) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or 
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are 
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or 
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the 
affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors . . . ; or 
(2) The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or 
interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are 
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract 
or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the 
shareholders; or 
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time 
it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a 
committee or the shareholders. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 56. See, e.g., In re Aquila Inc. S’holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(“Any assessment of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims must begin with a recognition that 
Delaware law does not impose a duty of entire fairness on controlling stockholders 
making a non-coercive tender or exchange offer to acquire shares directly from the 
minority holders.”); In re Siliconix Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001). 
 57. See, e.g., Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 54 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“By a pure 
§ 253 [short-form] merger, I refer to a § 253 merger that is not part of an integrated 
transaction that is appropriately subject to challenge under the entire fairness standard.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 
1994). 
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A further inquiry involves asking whether these results depend upon 
the phase of litigation.  To address this question, cases were categorized 
into four phases: preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss, summary 
judgment, and post-trial.  Table 2b summarizes the results. 
TABLE 2B                                                                                                                         
CASES BY PHASE 




Entire        
Fairness 
Preliminary injunction 4 14% 19 24% 59 18% 
Motion to dismiss 8 29% 16 20% 112 33% 
Summary judgment 4 14% 15 19% 65 19% 
Post-trial 12 43% 29 37% 99 30% 
 
Next, the statistical capabilities of the Pajek network analysis software 
were used to see whether there exists a statistically significant correlation 
between phase and outcome.  Rajski’s information indices were computed, 
in both symmetrical and asymmetrical versions,59 with the results displayed 
in Table 2c. 
 
The initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who 
stands on both sides of the transaction.  However, an approval of the 
transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority 
of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness 
from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 59. Rajski’s indices measure the degree to which the information in one  
classification is preserved in the other classification.  It has three variants: a 
symmetrical version, represented by (C1 ↔ C2) in the output of Pajek, and 
two asymmetrical versions, which indicate the extent to which the first 
classification can be predicted by the second (C1 ← C2) or the second 
classification can be predicted by the first (C1 → C2). 
DE NOOY ET AL., supra note 52, at 50–51.  Here, phase is denoted as C1 and outcome as C2. 
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TABLE 2C                                                                                                                   
RAJSKI’S INFORMATION INDICES 




Entire        
Fairness 
Phase ↔ Outcome      0.0745      0.0140     0.0175 
Phase → Outcome      0.1487      0.0308     0.0365 
Phase ← Outcome      0.1300      0.0252     0.0324 
 
Rajski’s indices are low, indicating that the outcomes are all but independent 
of phase.60 
Beyond statistical calculations, the network topologies offer additional 
insight.  First, visual inspection of the maps, especially those for intrinsic 
fairness (Figure 2) and entire fairness (Figure 3) show a large number of 
defendant-friendly cases, as represented by yellow and red nodes.  
Perhaps the most striking feature of the diagrams is the relative size of 
the blue versus the yellow and red nodes.  The largest nodes—the size of 
the node being proportional to the number of citations it receives—are 
blue, indicating plaintiff-friendly cases.  These landmark cases are, quite 
predictably, those we teach in corporate law: Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc.,61 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.62 and the like.  
Not discussed in a typical treatment of corporate law, however, are the 
large number of defendant-friendly cases, not as well-cited, but more 
numerous.  These are represented by the plethora of smaller red and 
yellow nodes which pepper the diagrams.  Put simply, while plaintiff-
friendly cases tend to garner a lot of attention as measured by inward 
citations, they are outnumbered in a landscape littered with defendant-
friendly cases.  By focusing on the larger plaintiff-friendly blue nodes, 
perhaps we are missing the overall, more defendant-friendly, picture. 
 
 60. Tables A1–A3, which summarize case outcomes by phase, provide more detail 
and are provided in the Appendix to this Article.  In particular, they shed some light on 
why the indices for inherent fairness are somewhat higher.  As Table A1 demonstrates, 
this is likely due to a greater number of plaintiff-friendly cases in the early stages of 
litigation.  While this raises a plausible hypothesis that courts are friendlier to plaintiffs 
in the early stages of litigation, the inherent fairness analysis is based on a small case 
universe.  Moreover, intrinsic fairness and entire fairness cases do not exhibit a similar 
pattern.  See Tables A2–A3, infra pp. 31–32. 
 61. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 62. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
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Where does this leave us in terms of observations such as those by 
Brudney and Chirelstein63 and Bratton and McCahery64 discussed above?  
It is fair perhaps to say that, in distinction to Brudney and Chirelstein’s 
assertion, the difference between the BJR and a standard such as 
intrinsic fairness is indeed “significant.”65  If the standard of review is 
the BJR, the defendant is virtually guaranteed to win; whereas with the 
fairness standards, plaintiffs at least have a chance, especially if the 
defendants have not been clever enough to use procedural techniques.66  
Bratton and McCahery’s assertion, on the other hand, seems to capture 
the empirical reality quite nicely: the “highly publicized cases, ruling 
against management”67 are the large blue nodes on the diagram; the 
 63. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 19. 
 64. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20. 
 65. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 19, at 318 n.49. 
 66. For examples of such techniques, see supra notes 53–58 and accompanying 
text. 
 67. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 681–82. 
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 seems instructive.  
 
“less well-publicized subsequent cases, . . . [which] refrain from 
applying the standards in management-constraining ways”68 are the 
numerous smaller yellow and red nodes.  It is, of course, difficult to 
judge a priori the merits of each individual case and the incentives to 
bring suit.  But the very fact that even the most heightened standard of 
scrutiny often favors defendants 69
In sum, despite a number of high profile cases articulating plaintiff-
friendly standards, the prospects for fairness review as a check on insider 
misbehavior look mixed.  These findings fit within the broader reality of 
limiting judicial review in corporate law.  As one commentator laments: 
    Over time, state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in a manner that left 
little substance.  The business judgment rule and universal adoption of waiver of 
liability provisions all but eliminated causes of action for breach of the duty of 
care.  The duty of loyalty, particularly self-dealing by officers and directors, 
could be validated through procedural mechanisms.  With proper procedures, 
the fairness of the transaction was not subject to judicial review.  This approach 
allowed self-dealing by officers and directors almost without limits.70 
Such a sobering view of the way in which procedural mechanisms can 
effectively eviscerate the most heightened form of scrutiny leads one to 
question the bite that Delaware case law has in constraining opportunistic 
managers.  Indeed, commentators suggest that investors “seem to consider 
the Delaware courts’ decisions to be inconsequential as regards shareholders’ 
wealth and, by implication, largely indeterminate of the outcome of 
future cases.”71  And in his detailed study of how Delaware case law is 
actually made, Edward Rock puts things succinctly by noting that “we 
come much closer to understanding the role of courts in corporate law if 
 68. Id. 
 69. One might conceivably argue that the relevant cases are simply those where 
the standard was applied in a plaintiff-friendly manner, versus those where the standard 
was applied and met by the defendant.  Under this analysis, 16 out of 20 (80%) of the 
inherent fairness cases, 31 out of 46 (67%) of the intrinsic fairness, and 127 out of 166 
(77%) of the entire fairness cases would be plaintiff-friendly.  See Table 2a, supra p. 15.  
However, this analysis does not capture the number of times defendants are able to evade 
the standard through carefully-orchestrated procedural maneuvers.  See supra notes 53–
58 and accompanying text. 
 70. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of 
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 71. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A 
Study of Investors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551, 603 
(1987). 




we think of judges more as preachers than as policemen.”72  The uneven 
quality of the fairness standards would seem to support Rock’s assessment. 
The bottom line is simple: the putatively plaintiff-friendly fairness 
standards often do not help plaintiffs.  A cynic might be forgiven for 
thinking that fairness standards are frequently little more than eloquent 
rhetorical flourish: just enough to generate the rare spectacular case and 
generate a steady stream of litigation and impressive citations, but not 
enough to protect shareholders in a systematic manner.  While the 
conventional wisdom might suggest that standards of review are typically 
outcome determinative,73 the empirical research suggests the fairness 
standard is not—something at least one court has suggested.74 
B.  Is the Jurisprudence Precise Enough to Inform Different                
Standards of Fairness? 
The second question asks whether the analysis of the fairness cases 
suggests a jurisprudence precise enough to inform three different standards 
of fairness review.  The answer, simply put, is no: courts too often 
intermingle the standards without offering useful justification.  Existing 
jurisprudence provides colorful rhetoric but is too often imprecise. 
Again, both statistics and network topology can offer perspective.  
One way to approach the problem is to consider the consistency of the 
citations.  Citations are grouped into two categories: those that are 
linguistically consistent and those that are not.  Here, linguistic consistency 
is defined straightforwardly: if a court cites another case for the analysis 
of a specific fairness standard, and the cited case actually discusses the 
standard, the citation is deemed linguistically consistent.  For example, if 
case A cites case B in its analysis of “entire fairness” and case B actually 
discusses entire fairness, the citation is consistent.  On the other hand, if the 
cited case does not discuss the standard, the citation is deemed linguistically 
inconsistent.  For instance, case A cites case B in its analysis of entire 
fairness, but case B actually discusses intrinsic fairness or inherent fairness. 
 72. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). 
 73. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 
111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business 
judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the 
determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative 
of the outcome of derivative litigation.”). 
 74. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del. 1993) (“In a case such as 
this where the business judgment rule is not applicable and the entire fairness test is 
applicable, the imposition of the latter test is not, alone, outcome-determinative.  The 
doctrine of entire fairness does not lend itself to bright line precision or rigid doctrine.”). 
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TABLE 3                                                                                                                  
CITATION CONSISTENCY 




Entire        
Fairness 
Linguistically consistent 30 91% 51 51% 680 84% 
Linguistically inconsistent 3 9% 45 45% 125 15% 
To non-Delaware cases 0 0% 4 4% 7 1% 
Total citations (arcs) 33 100% 100 100%     812 100% 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results.  Interestingly, while all three standards 
have a nontrivial number of inconsistent citations, the number of 
inconsistencies in the intrinsic fairness analysis is most pronounced.  
The most likely reason for this discrepancy is that two of the most well-
cited cases in fairness analysis, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.75 and Sterling 
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,76 do not discuss intrinsic fairness.  Thus, any 
court citing these cases as part of its intrinsic fairness analysis is being 
linguistically inconsistent. 
Network maps reveal the same pattern.  Black arcs represent 
consistent citations whereas light grey ones represent inconsistent ones.  
Visual inspection of the three diagrams shows a greater proportion of 
light grey arcs on the intrinsic fairness map, followed by the entire 
fairness and inherent fairness maps.  More generally, there are a surprising 
number of grey lines on the diagrams. 
A few specific examples might add texture to the findings.  Even the 
canonical fairness cases, perhaps unwittingly, blend standards.  For 
instance, Weinberger’s most famous passage states that: 
When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, 
they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most 
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.  The requirement of fairness is 
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, 
he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of 
careful scrutiny by the courts.77 
 
 75. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 76. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952). 
 77. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (emphasis added). 




Similarly, a number of cases argue simply that the “words ‘entire 
fairness’ are synonymous with the words ‘intrinsic fairness.’”78 
Perhaps this is an unnecessarily nitpicking analysis.  After all, one 
might argue that these three standards are about fairness in a generic 
sense as distinguished from the BJR.  But this begs an obvious question: 
why then have three different linguistic articulations?  Part of the 
explanation may simply be that as the common law evolves and accretes, 
inconsistencies emerge.  Perhaps additionally, having these different 
standards simply makes for a rich menu of rhetoric about protecting 
shareholders.  As three former and current Delaware judges tellingly 
note in the context of the overall proliferation of standards of review in 
Delaware corporate jurisprudence: 
Additionally, the creation of more, rather than fewer, standards of review tends 
to create a false sense of doctrinal safety, encouraging boards to act in ways 
that, although enabling their actions to fall into the right categorical box, does 
not necessarily create the result most genuinely protective of the interests of 
stockholders.79 
Convoluted standards seem to be having mixed results in helping 
shareholders.  Such findings thus support a call for simplification of 
standards.  This would be consistent with what the Delaware Supreme 
Court once casually suggested in the context of the use of the simple 
word fair in Delaware’s safe harbor statute.80  It is also congruent with 
what the American Law Institute (ALI) provides in a Comment to its 
Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Section 5.02 [Transactions with the Corporation] does not use phrases such as 
“entire fairness,” “inherent fairness,” or “intrinsic fairness,” which have 
sometimes been used by the courts in duty of fair dealing cases, but which 
 78. Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979); see also 
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 469 (Del. 1991) (“The standard for intrinsic fairness is 
the searching test announced in Weinberger.  The interested directors bear the burden of 
proving the entire fairness of the transaction in all its aspects, including both the fairness 
of the price and the fairness of the directors’ dealings.” (emphasis added)); Schreiber v. 
Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (“[W]hen the test of intrinsic fairness is 
deemed to apply, the burden shifts to the defendants to show the entire fairness of the 
transaction under the careful watch of the courts.” (emphasis added)); Trans World 
Airlines v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch. 1977) (“Application of the intrinsic 
fairness test also requires that the parent corporation bear the burden of establishing the 
entire fairness of a transaction under attack.” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 79. Allen et al., supra note 4, at 869. 
 80. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995) 
(“The entire fairness test is codified and has been construed by this Court many times.  
See 8 Del. C. § 144(a)(3).”); see also Siegel, supra note 23, at 49 n.101 (“[F]airness in 
§ 144(a)(3) of the Delaware code, also now means entire fairness.” (citation omitted)).  
For the text of section 144(a)(3), see supra note 55. 
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afford insufficient guidance in analyzing particular transactions and suggest an 
often unattainable degree of precision in analysis.81 
It cannot be overemphasized that simplification cannot simply mean a 
further watering down to some anemic notion of fairness.  As David 
Yablon argues in his analysis of the “fuzzy” nature of fairness as a 
standard of review: 
The case law often states that the criteria for approval of these transactions is 
not just fairness but full fairness, “entire fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” or “the 
most scrupulous inherent fairness.” 
    Little attention has been paid to these extra adjectives, and indeed, it is 
difficult to define, in any abstract sense, what the difference between fairness 
and entire fairness or intrinsic fairness might be.  Yet in the context of fairness 
as a fuzzy property, there seems little doubt that all these adjectives function as 
intensifiers to the property “fairness” and as such, send a subtle message to the 
judge concerning the substantive criteria to be used in determining fairness.  In 
our hypothetical, the judge may be quite uncertain whether $25 is a fair price for 
the stock, but as she peruses the case law, and is instructed to rule against any 
prices not fully or entirely or inherently fair, she will view these adjectives as 
setting a higher standard than mere fairness—something akin to a very fair 
standard.82 
 81. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
Comment to § 5.02(a)(2)(A) (1994).  As one commentator notes: 
    The decisions that have addressed the duty of loyalty problem are replete 
with terms such as “inherent fairness,” “intrinsic fairness,” and “entire fairness.”  
Unfortunately, use of these terms is seldom accompanied by a more concrete 
definition of the factors to be considered in determining whether a given 
transaction is fair. 
Deborah K. Hayes, Comment, Corporate Director Conflicts of Interest: The Fairness 
Test and Its Application Under Existing Statutory Provisions and Proposals for Statutory 
Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV. 799, 817–18 (1986) (citations omitted).  The most extensive 
description of fairness is nearly twenty-five years old: 
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.  The 
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the 
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.  The latter 
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the 
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, 
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent 
value of a company’s stock. . . .  However, the test for fairness is not a 
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price.  All aspects of the issue must 
be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted). 
 82. Yablon, supra note 53, at 512 (footnotes omitted); cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719–20 (Del. 1971) (“The standard of intrinsic fairness involves 
both a high degree of fairness and a shift in the burden of proof.  Under this standard the 
burden is on Sinclair to prove, subject to careful judicial scrutiny, that its transactions 
with Sinven were objectively fair.”); Brabson, supra note 18, at 145 n.42 (“In using the 
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While simplification would be a positive step, the standards must 
converge to a form of judicial review that actually has bite.83 
C.  Does the Case Law Exhibit a Skewed Distribution? 
As suggested in Part II, this third question requires the most 
straightforward analysis.  A standard measure in the network theory 
literature can help capture the topology of a directed network such as the 
fairness citation patterns.  “Indegree” is a simple measure that calculates 
the number of citations (arcs) a case (node) receives.84 
The indegree of the nodes within each network reveals a skewed 
pattern.  For example, 25 out of the 28 inherent fairness cases (89%), 64 
out of 79 intrinsic fairness cases (81%), and 241 out of the 335 entire 
fairness cases (72%) receive one or fewer citations.  By contrast, the top 
5% of cases receive approximately 61%, 39%, and 53% of the inherent, 
intrinsic, and entire fairness citations respectively.  Figures 4a–4c present 
























Figure 4a:  Indegree - Inherent Fairness
 
 
terms ‘inherent fairness’ and ‘intrinsic fairness,’ courts seem to be referring to an overall 
objective standard for judging the ‘entire fairness’ of a transaction, as opposed to a 
director’s subjective belief in a transaction’s fairness.”). 
 83. To the extent that the Delaware courts really intend for the standards to mean 
different things, then it is incumbent upon them to articulate those differences.  For 
example, one might argue that the “intrinsic fairness” standard represents a higher level 
of fairness scrutiny applicable in controlled mergers.  Such a position would be congruent 
with the use of “intrinsic fairness” in cases such as Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, but as 
Figure 2 illustrates, the standard is currently employed well beyond the context of 
controlled mergers. 
 84. See DE NOOY ET AL., supra note 52, at 189 (“The popularity of indegree of a 
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Visual inspection of the network maps supports these findings.  There 
are a small number of highly cited cases (large vertices), and a large 
number of cases that are either never or rarely cited (small vertices).  In 
the language of network theory, the highly cited cases serve as “hubs.”  
As discussed in Part IV.A, however, there is an interesting twist to the 
story: the famous plaintiff-friendly hubs (blue vertices) tend to overshadow 
the large number of uncited or rarely cited defendant-friendly cases 
(yellow and red vertices).  In other words, the overall topology of the 
networks is much more defendant-friendly than their hubs suggest. 
Notwithstanding this additional finding, both statistical and visual 
analyses confirm that Delaware case law discussing fairness displays a 
highly skewed distribution similar to that found in other studies of both 
legal and nonlegal networks.85 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has used three questions to frame an empirical analysis of 
Delaware case law focused on fairness standards of review.  First, the 
evidence suggests that corporate insiders often win cases even when 
courts recognize impressive-sounding fairness standards, as plaintiff-
friendly precedent gets reinterpreted in a defendant-friendly manner.  
Second, the jurisprudence is not precise enough to inform different 
standards of fairness.  The differences between entire fairness, intrinsic 
fairness, and inherent fairness are elusive.  Surprisingly, cases sometimes do 
not even articulate the specific standard for which they are cited. 
Third, and most simply, Delaware fairness case law exhibits a highly 
skewed distribution that resembles a power law: a small number of cases 
get cited a disproportionate number of times; the bulk of the cases 
remain obscure.  This finding lends further support to the notion that the 
topology approximates a scale-free network.  In a fascinating twist, it 
appears that the small number of hub cases tend to be plaintiff-friendly, 
whereas the large number of infrequently-cited cases are defendant-
friendly.  Undue focus on the hub cases in corporate law teaching and 
scholarship has perhaps characterized fairness standards as having more 
bite against insiders than analyzing the entire network of cases would 
suggest. 
Although the analysis is at one level quite technical and narrowly 
focused on a particular aspect of Delaware law, it does present broader 
implications.  From a methodological point of view, it suggests that 
network theory can serve as an important analytical tool in drawing rich 
topologies from which an analyst may discern patterns, especially when 
 85. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
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combined with some basic statistical analyses.  From a substantive point 
of view, the results suggest that fairness analysis is at least in part 
impressive rhetoric.  Such a conclusion lends credence to the observations 
of scholars such as William Bratton and Joseph McCahery who suggest 
that “the genius of Delaware lawmakers lies in their ability to generate a 
thick fiduciary law without at the same time imposing a significant 
compliance burden.”86  The implications for corporate law are significant.  
After all, if corporation statutes, the BJR, and now even fairness analysis 
serve only as a limited check on insider behavior, then to what extent has 
corporate law given up on protecting shareholders? 
Indeed, this Article analyzes fairness since it is the least deferential of 
standards and presumably thus the least likely to get watered down.  But 
more work needs to be done to see whether similar patterns exist across 
other standards of heightened scrutiny.  In particular, I will be performing 
similar analyses on the other standards of heightened scrutiny in Delaware 
jurisprudence: notably the Unocal/Unitrin87 and Revlon88 standards that 
go beyond the business judgment rule in the context of change-of-control 
transactions, Blasius89 in the context of the shareholder franchise, as well 
as the Zapata90 “two-step” which sometimes requires a court to exercise 
its own business judgment in the context of presuit demand.  An 
additional avenue of new research would be to perform more in-depth 
mathematical analysis of the findings.  A narrow issue might be to more 
precisely model the skewed distribution to see whether it is technically a 
power law distribution, or another highly skewed formation.91  More 
broadly, developing network maps of Delaware’s jurisprudence yields a 
series of matrices that reveal the characteristics of cases and their 
 86. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 691. 
 87. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371–75 (Del. 1995); 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). 
 88. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 
(Del. 1986). 
 89. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 90. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981). 
 91. For example, Seth Chandler suggests that Supreme Court citation patterns 
might match a Weibull distribution.  See Chandler, supra note 35, at 15.  More generally, 
the network can be analyzed using rate equations from statistical physics.  The central 
insight is that in a power law distribution, the probability of attachment to a node is 
linear with the node’s degree; however, there might be other distributions, although 
skewed, with which the probability of attachment is sublinear to node degree.  For a 
detailed explanation, see P.L. Krapivksy & S. Redner, Rate Equation Approach for 
Growing Networks, in STATISTICAL MECHANICS OF COMPLEX NETWORKS 3, 4–7 (R. 
Pastor-Satorras et al. eds., 2003). 




interdependencies—data that lends itself particularly well to the 
techniques of linear algebra. 
If the empirical study of fairness is any harbinger, the results are likely 
to similar:92 seemingly impressive standards of review create the veneer 
of substantive review but likely provide a limited core upon which to 
base corporate governance and protect shareholders.  It is no coincidence 
that multiple layers of securities regulation have been necessary to begin 
to protect shareholders.93  Corporate law might be too often enamored of 
its fancy rhetoric. 
 92. The intuition of some commentators suggests as much.  See, e.g., Sean J. 
Griffith, Daedelean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1262 (2006) (“Unocal was 
slowly eroded through lax application.  Revlon was narrowed.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and 
Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (2002) 
(“Subsequent Delaware cases have dramatically reduced Revlon’s significance by 
making clear that if the directors of the firm decide not to sell, or if they prefer a stock-
for-stock exchange with another public firm, Revlon is irrelevant.”). 
 93. See Dibadj, supra note 1. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1  INHERENT FAIRNESS OUTCOMES BY PHASE 
 Plaintiff-friendly Defendant-friendly Neither Total 




   
 # cases % # cases % # cases % # cases % # cases 
Preliminary 
injunction 
3 75% 1 25% 0 0% 0 0% 4 
Motion  to 
dismiss 
6 75% 2 25% 0 0% 0 0% 8 
Summary 
judgment 
2 50% 1 25% 1 25% 0 0% 4 
Post-trial 5 42% 2 17% 3 25% 2 17% 12 
 
TABLE A2  INTRINSIC FAIRNESS OUTCOMES BY PHASE 
 Plaintiff-friendly Defendant-friendly Neither Total 




   
 # cases % # cases % # cases % # cases % # cases 
Preliminary 
injunction 
6 32% 9 47% 4 21% 0 0% 19 
Motion  to 
dismiss 
6 38% 7 44% 2 13% 1 6% 16 
Summary 
judgment 
7 47% 6 40% 2 13% 0 0% 15 
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TABLE A3  ENTIRE FAIRNESS OUTCOMES BY PHASE 
 Plaintiff-friendly Defendant-friendly Neither Total 




   
 # cases % # cases % # cases % # cases % # cases 
Preliminary 
injunction 
18 31% 28 47% 9 15% 4 7% 59 
Motion  to 
dismiss 
48 43% 49 44% 4 4% 11 10% 112 
Summary 
judgment 
20 31% 34 52% 4 6% 7 11% 65 
Post-trial 41 41% 28 28% 22 22% 8 8% 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
